

Traffic Classification Using Visual Motifs: An Empirical Evaluation

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
²RedJack, LLC

VizSec 2010


Overview

- Background
- Visual Motifs
- Traffic Classification
- Empirical Evaluation


Motivation



Motivation




Goals




Assumptions

- Reliable transport via TCP
- Stream Cipher
 - No access to payload
 - Payload length preservation
- Encryption at or above Transport Layer


Bigram Heatmaps




Heatmap Construction




Heatmap Construction




Heatmap Construction




Heatmap Construction



Heatmap Construction



Heatmap Construction



(48, -48)
(-48, 40)
(40, 891)
(891, -40)
(-40, -270)
(-270, -1500)
(-1500, 40)
(40, -1500)
(-1500, 40)


Heatmap Construction

(-48, 40) (-1500, 40) (-1500, 40)	(40, 891)
(-40, -270) (-270, -1500)	(48, -48) (891, -40) (40, -1500)





Heatmap Construction

$3/9 = 33.3\%$	$1/9 = 11.1\%$
$2/9 = 22.2\%$	$3/9 = 33.3\%$

Heatmap Construction




Bigram Heatmaps




Modeling Protocol Behavior

$3/9 = 33.3\%$ 1	$1/9 = 11.1\%$ 2
$2/9 = 22.2\%$ 3	$3/9 = 33\%$ 4


Modeling Protocol Behavior




Comparing Protocol Models




Comparing Protocol Models



Comparing Protocol Models



Comparing Protocol Models



Classifying Samples

- 1 Create training models for desired protocols
- 2 Build testing model for network trace to be classified
- 3 Find training model with lowest L_1 distance

$$L_1(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{\mathcal{A}_{\phi_i}}{\mathcal{A}_\tau} - \frac{\mathcal{B}_{\phi_i}}{\mathcal{B}_\tau} \right|$$

Classification Confidence Threshold

- Goal: Eliminate close calls
- Require 1st place candidate to lead 2nd place by certain amount to make decision
- Based on standard deviation of L_1 distances

Evaluation

- Parameter Selection
 - Bin size
 - Confidence threshold
 - Training set size
- Precision


$$\frac{\textit{true positives}}{\textit{true positives} + \textit{false positives}}$$

- Recall

$$\frac{\textit{true positives}}{\textit{true positives} + \textit{false negatives}}$$

Evaluation

- Trial :=
 - 1 Randomly sample some percentage of available data for each port and **train** classifier
 - 2 Randomly sample some number ($\lambda = 45,000$) of the remaining data points for each port and create **testing** samples
 - 3 Classify testing samples
- 50 Trials



dartmouth Dataset

- Weekdays: January 19, 2004 – February 6, 2004
- Top 10 ports by number of sessions observed
 - 25 (SMTP), 80 (HTTP), 88 (Kerberos), 110 (POP3), 135 (DCE), 139 (NetBIOS), 443 (HTTPS), 445 (MDS), 902 (VMware), 1214 (Kazaa)
- No payload data
- Used for parameter selection

Total Packets	1.3 Billion
Traffic Volume	707 GB
Observed Ports	64,214
Sessions	5.2 Million

darpa Data

- *1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation*
- Weeks 1, 3, 4, 5
- Ports 21 (FTP), 23 (Telnet), 25 (SMTP), 79 (finger), 80 (HTTP), 110 (POP3)
- Additional cross-validation using parameter values determined from dartmouth.

Total Packets	60 Million
Traffic Volume	12 GB
Observed Ports	10,274
Sessions	1.6 Million

dartmouth Results

- Server Message Block (SMB) protocol
 - Used for Windows resource sharing
 - Windows NT: via NetBIOS (NBT) on TCP 139
 - Windows 2000: directly on TCP 445
- Clients with NetBIOS enabled try connections on TCP 139 and TCP 445

Reference: <http://www.ntsecurity.nu/papers/port445/>


darpa Results

50 Trials

15% Training Set
Size

45,000 Data
Points Testing Set
Size

$k = 0.75$
Confidence
Threshold




Inter-dataset Analysis

50 Trials



15% Training Set
Size (dartmouth)

45,000 Data
Points Testing Set
Size (darpa)



$k = 0.25$
Confidence
Threshold



Inter-dataset Analysis




Inter-dataset Analysis



Mailbomb attack?

Inter-dataset Analysis



Limitations

- Must be trained on network to be tested
- Reliance on session de-multiplexing
- TCP only
- Deliberate attempts to disguise traffic (Folga et al., Wright et al. 2009)

Future Work

- On-line classification
- Protocol subcategorization (e.g., SSH interactive vs. SCP file transfer)

Conclusion

- Modeling protocol behavior using only packet size, direction, and order
- Resistant to encryption
- High precision and recall
- Quick and reliable traffic inspection
- Useful for anomaly and misuse detection

Questions?

Thanks for listening.

Q & A

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