


Interactive Detection of Network Anomalies via Coordinated Multiple Views


Lane Harrison, Xianlin Hu, Xiaowei Ying, Aidong Lu, Weichao Wang, Xintao Wu University of North Carolina at Charlotte


Outline



<section-header>


Spectral Analysis





2





One can have, some claim, as many electronic personas as one has time and energy to create.


Defined by J. R. Douceur, 2002

Fundamental problem in P2P networks



Shirley Ardell Mason (Sybil)





Sybil Attack Threats

Voting Systems

Reputation Systems


Misbehavior Detection

Routing

Distributed Storage

Resource Allocation






Sybil Attack Types

Direct vs. Indirect

Fabrication vs. Impersonation

Simultaneous vs. Non-Simultaneous



Sybil Defense

Device Resource Testing


Radio Signal Testing

Location Testing

Random Key Pre-distribution

Topological Methods






Spectral Analysis


Part of Graph Theory

Assigns metrics to topological features of nodes in a network

Many other metrics remain unexplored in visualization








Putting it together

Sybil nodes, under most cases, have similar neighbors over time.

Non-randomness values for these nodes are high.

This alone is not enough to achieve detection with certainty.

CMV




Coordinated Multiple Views


Auto-detection amplification

Iterative exploration

Simulated wireless network data used








Spectral - Scatterplot


Display Degree/Random or EigV1/EigV2

Selections are shown in the graph space

Spatially consistent position of outliers








Graph - Node-Link


Connectivity relationships and subgraphs

Better suited for interactions (vs. matrix visualizations)

Limited scalability, but could only visualize outliers









Temporal - Time-Histogram


Used to identify suspicious durations


Necessary for detection success







Direct Sybil Attack






Direct Sybil Attack







Direct Sybil Attack




Case Studies





Indirect Sybil Attack







Indirect Sybil Attack






Indirect Sybil Attack





Detection Rate Comparison



Conclusion

Detection can be achieved by combining CMV with automated-analysis.

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